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Bank Capital Regulation in the Early 19805
During the early 1980s, a subjective, peer group
type ofcapital regulation was replaced with
objective minimum capital-to-asset ratio require-
ments. This Letter examines banks' reactions to
the change. Specifically, data on the 100 largest
bank holding companies are used to examine
whether banking organizations with ratios below
the minimums raised their capital ratios to meet
the new standards.
In addition, this Letter explores whether the
observed increases in book value capital repre-
sented an actual capital infusion in market value
terms or whether they merely resulted from
accounting adjustments. This issue is important
because the risk exposure ofthe deposit insur-
ance fund depends on the market value, not the
book value, capital ratio.
Capital and risk
Banking regulators have a strong interest in
ensuring that banks maintain adequate financial
capital (the difference between their assets and
liabilities) for two reasons.
First, additional capital can reduce the exposure
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(the FDIC) to bank losses. When a bank fails and
is liquidated, the FDIC's loss equals the bank's
liabilities minus the liquidation (market) value of
its assets. Thus, the greater proportion of assets
funded with capital rather than liabilities (and
therefore the largerare assets relative to lia-
bilities), the smaller the FDIC's loss, all other
things equal.
Second, as discussed in a previous Letter (May
22, 1987), more capital likely reduces a bank's
incentive to increase asset risk and thereby
impose a risk of a loss on the FDIC.
Peer group regulation
Prior to the 1980s, subjective capital standards
were the main form of capital regulation. Typ-
ically, regulators compared capital-to-asset
ratios for bank peer groups (banks grouped by
common characteristics such as asset size) and
tried to ensure that banks with capital ratios
lower than their peer group's average raised
their capital ratios.
This peer group type of capital regulation was
criticized on several grounds. First, the risk of a
bank's failure (and expected losses) depends on
the level of its capital ratio relative to its own
asset risk, not relative to an average of other
banks' capital ratios. Second, results from a
number of academic studies suggested that peer
group regulation was not effective. And third,
since deposit insurance provides an incentive for
banks to reduce capital, a peer group's average
capital may drift downward over time, thereby
increasing the risk exposure of the deposit insur-
ance system.
Capital regulation, 1981-85
In December of 1981, the three federal bank
regulatory agencies first jointly announced spe-
cific minimum capital standards. With the
exception of the 17 largest banking organiza-
tions - the multinationals - minimum "pri-
mary" capital was set at 6 percent of assets for
banks and bank holding companies with assets
less than $1 billion and 5 percent for organiza-
tions of $1 billion or more. (Primary capital
includes mainly common equity, loan loss
reserves, and perpetual preferred stock.)
As stated in the January 1982 Federal Reserve
Bulletin, one purpose of this regulation was
"... (to) address the sizable existing disparity in
capital ratios among banking organizations of
different size." Even though the multinationals
were exempted from the December 1981
requirements because oftheir low capital ratios,
the agencies announced that the regulations
would be amended "... (to) insure that appro-
priate steps are taken to improve over time the
capital positions of banking organizations in this
group."
Consistent with this, the 5 percent requirement
was extended to the multinationals in June
1983, and a uniform 5.5 percent primary capitalFRBSF
ratio was required for all banking organizations
regardless of size in June of1985. (Minimum
"total" capital, which consists of primary capital
plus limited life preferred stock and subordi-
nated notes and debentures, was set at 6
percent.)
The evolution in capital requirements was con-
sistentwith the goal ofthe 1981 regulafionsto
bring uniformity to capital regulation over time.
Thus, one might argue that the 1985 uniform
standards were the ultimate objective even as
early as December of 1981 . In keeping with th is
interpretation, in this Letter, banks that would
have met the 1985 requirement in 1981 serve as
a "control" group against which the behavior of
banks that would not have met the requirement
is compared. The former group is referredto as
"capital-sufficient banks", andthe latter, as
"capital-deficient banks."
Effects on.book capital ratios
If the capital regulations themselves and not
some other economic trend affected banks' capi-
tal ratios, one wouldexpectthe capital ratios of
the capital-deficient group of banks to rise rela-
tive to the capital-sufficientcontrol group. More-
over, eventually the capital ratios of the two
groups should be indistinguishable.
In Chart 1, mean primary book capital~to-asset
ratios are plotted separatelyfor capital-sufficient
and -deficient banks. The chart shows that capi-
tal-deficient banks did increase their capital
ratios relative to the capital-sufficient banks - a
pattern consistent with the hypothesis that reg-
ulation was the cause ofthe increase. The chart
also shows a slight rise in the capital ratios of the
capital-sufficient banks, perhaps due to the
increase .in the minimum ratio from 5 to 5.5 per-
cent inJune of 1985 for banks with $1 billion or
more in assets (a characteristic of almost all of
the capital-sufficient banks in the sample.)
Statistical analysis also confirms that capital-
deficient banks did increase their capital ratios
relative to the capital-sufficient banks, and that
the long-run target capital ratios ofthe two
groups were statistically indistinguishable during
the post-1981 period. Moreover, the variance of
capital ratios across all·banks declined both
because differences in the mean ratios of the
two groups werevirtually eliminatedand also
because capital-sufficient banks' capital ratios
were clustered more tightly about the mean after
the new regulations were instituted.
Capital buffers
The results also suggest that, after adjusting to
the new capital regulations, banks' capital ratios
exceeded the required minimum on average.
Such a capital buffer might be expected for sev-
eral reasons, including regulatory requirements
to maintain capital above the minimum
(especially for banks with riskier portfolios), the
desire to avoid regulatory penalties ifcapital
ratios were to fall belowthe minimum because
of unexpected losses or growth opportunities
undertaken; and higher standards for total capi-
tal (6 percent for minimum and 7 percent for
"adequate" total capita!), which some banks
met by holding primary capital of 6 percent or
more.
Accountinggimmicks?
However, a key question remains. Did book
capital ratios rise because of a true market value
capital infusion or simply because of accounting
gimmicks?
One commonly used accounting technique that
would boost book capital without a change in
market value capital is the realization of capital
gains through the sale of appreciated assets and
the purchase of other assets with the proceeds.
The difference between the book and current
values of the appreciated asset would cause
book capital and assets each to increase by the
amount of the gain, thereby raising the book
capital ratio even though nothing had changed
on the bank's market value balance sheet.
Similarly, through the issuance of standby letters
of credit (SLCs), banks can in effect fund assets
off balance sheet with off-balance sheet lia-
bilities issued with recourse. However, the
effects on a bank's market value capital ratio of
so doing are identical to those of funding assets
on balance sheet.
Capital and asset growth
If selective realization of capital gains and pur-
chasing of new assets had been the main
method of increasing capital ratios, one would
expect to find both increased capital and asset
growth rates (but with larger growth rates for
capitaL)
In fad, however, capital-deficient banks met the
new capital requirements primarily by slowing
asset growth, both relative to their pre-1982
growth rates and relative to the growth rates ofCHART 1
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capital-sufficient banks. Some banks might have·
sold appreciated assets to retire liabilities,
thereby overstating the actual increase in their
capital ratios, but doing so would still have
caused market value capital ratios to rise.
To see whether an increase in off-balance sheet
banking might have causedtherise in capital
ratios, banks' capital ratios were re-computed as
if the loans backed by SLCs had been funded
with on-balance sheet liabilities. Although incor-
porating SLCs on the balance sheet does result
in lower capital ratios, especially for the capital-
deficient group, there still was a significant
increase in this group's book capital ratio.
In sum, these two pieces of evidence suggest
that banks actually did increase their capital
ratios in keeping with the intent of the new capi-
tal regulations.
Market value ratios
If the observed increases in book capital were
due to an actual capital infusion, one would
expect observed market value capital ratios, cal-
culated using the market value of banks' stocks
to assign a market value to banks' capital, also
to rise, all other things equal.
Chart 2 shows that the market value capital
ratios rose dramatically for both groups, but,
unlike the behavior of book capital ratios, there
was not a larger increase for the capital-deficient
banks. Since the control group's ratios rose sub-
stantially, it seems likely that forces other than
regulation were at work.
If these other forces had identical effects on both
groups of banks, these results would bring into
question the meaningfulness of the book value
increases. However, there are several reasons
these other forces might have had differential
effects, including stock market and interest rate
trends and changes in regulatory burdens or
subsidies.
Although statistical analysis suggests that general
stock market and interest rate trends do partly
explain the upward rise in the control group's
capital ratios, there is no strong evidence that
they had a smaller effect on capital-deficient
banks that might have offset the presumably
larger effect of capital regulation.
Differentialchanges in regulatory subsidies and/
or burdens might explain why the observed mar-
ket value ratios for the capital~deficient group
did not rise relative to the capital-sufficient
group. For example, higher capital ratios could
have diminished the value of deposit insurance
or reduced profitability for the capital-deficient
group.
Thus, although the pattern of increase in market
value ratios is consistent with observed increases
in book value capital, it does not lend indepen-
dent support to the conclusion that regulation
raised banks' market value capital ratios and
reduced the risk exposure ofthe deposit insur-
ance fund.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 207,821 - 169 - 6,416 - 2.9
Loans and Leases1 6 184,030 33 - 9,535 - 4.9
Commercial and Industrial 52,554 121 - 4,624 - 8.0
Real estate 72,538 - 123 4,621 6.8
Loans to Individuals 37,648 167 - 4,312 - 10.2
Leases 5,450 13 - 141 - 2.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,421 - 255 2,953 21.9
Other Securities2 7,370 54 164 2.2
Total Deposits 209,812 1,484 - 14,081 - 6.2
Demand Deposits 55,242 1,629 - 12,968 - 19.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 39,296 2,980 - 2,425 - 5.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,217 24 164 0.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,353 - 169 - 1,277 - 0.9
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,898 16 - 3,204 - 6.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 31,647 - 191 - 761 - 2.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,453 302 - 7,523 - 27.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, .unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.5. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change